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OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
This case requires us to address the scope of the legal
theory of “honest services” fraud as applied to the conduct of
persons who are not public officials. Defendants appeal their
convictions of honest services mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§
1341, 1343, 1346, and 2. We will affirm the judgment of the
District Court on counts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 because the
Superseding Indictment is sufficient as to those counts. We will
vacate the judgment on counts 10, 11, 13, 19, 20, 21, and 22
because the specific facts alleged in those counts of the
Superseding Indictment do not constitute honest services fraud
under § 1346.
I.
The Ben Franklin Technology Center (BFTC) was a
publicly-funded, non-profit corporation based in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania created
BFTC in the early 1980s—along with three other
organizations—in an effort to encourage the development and
commercialization of new technology. BFTC administered
funds allocated by the Commonwealth through the Department
of Community and Economic Development for economic
development grants. The Commonwealth provided BFTC with
3

these funds upon the condition that BFTC would spend them for
approved purposes—such as grants and administrative
expenses—and in conformity with the public mission of the
organization. Any breach of BFTC’s obligations to the
Commonwealth could have jeopardized BFTC’s state funding.
In 1995, BFTC entered into an agreement with the United
States Navy to administer, on behalf of the Office of Naval
Research, a project known as the National Network for ElectroOptics Manufacturing Technology (NNEOMT). The NNEOMT
operated as a consortium: the Navy provided funding and the
BFTC administered the program, including the disbursement of
the appropriate amounts to subcontractors who were involved in
the research and development of electro-optics technologies.
The NNEOMT Agreement provided that any funds allocated
thereunder were to be used solely for administering NNEOMT.
From September of 1994 to July of 1998, Lawrence
McGeehan was the President and Chief Executive Officer of
BFTC, and Kathleen Haluska was the Vice-President and Chief
Operating Officer. Together, McGeehan and Haluska were
responsible for BFTC’s daily operations and budget-related
issues, including the administration of the NNEOMT
Agreement.
A federal grand jury returned an Indictment charging
McGeehan and Haluska (collectively, “defendants”) with twenty
counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346,
and 2, and two counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
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1343, 1346, and 2. A Superseding Indictment charged the same
twenty-two counts of the Indictment and alleged an additional
seven counts of fraud against the United States in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1031 and 2.
The Superseding Indictment charged that, instead of
faithfully managing BFTC’s operations and fulfilling its
administrative duties under the NNEOMT Agreement,
McGeehan and Haluska caused the BFTC to use its funding
from the Commonwealth and the Navy to pay for personal
expenditures for themselves and others, and to cover costs that
did not have a proper business purpose.
Counts 1 through 9 of the Superseding Indictment alleged
that defendants devised a scheme to defraud BFTC of their
honest services by misusing its funding, making “excessive
expenditures for purposes such as lavish travel and
entertainment,” subverting its fiscal controls, improperly
withholding information from BFTC’s Board of Directors, and
threatening, intimidating, and/or removing employees who
questioned their misuse of authority.
Counts 10 through 22 of the Superseding Indictment
alleged that BFTC, under the management of defendants, “owed
the United States Navy a duty of honest services pursuant to its
cont[r]act to administer NNEOMT,” and that the defendants
“devised a scheme and artifice to defraud the United States
Navy of the intangible right of honest services owed to it by
BFTC . . . .” The Superseding Indictment further alleged that
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defendants defrauded the Navy of BFTC’s honest services using
mail and wire communications, which caused BFTC to use
NNEOMT funds for unauthorized purposes.
Counts 23 through 29 alleged that defendants knowingly
caused BFTC to execute a scheme and artifice to defraud and to
obtain money and property from the Navy having a value in
excess of one million dollars or more, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1031 and 2.
Defendants each filed pre-trial motions seeking, among
other things, to dismiss the first twenty-two counts of the
Superseding Indictment. McGeehan argued that the allegations
in counts 1 through 9 were insufficient to state an honest
services fraud offense because the Government did not allege
that he profited illegally from his conduct, nor did the
Government allege a violation of state law, which he claimed
was “required as a limiting principle on [the] prosecution.”
McGeehan also contended that counts 10 through 22—the mail
and wire fraud counts that named the Navy as the victim—were
insufficient for an honest services fraud charge insofar as he
owed no fiduciary duty to the Navy. Haluska’s motion to
dismiss echoed McGeehan’s motion with respect to counts 10
through 22. With respect to counts 1 through 9, however,
Haluska argued that honest services fraud is limited to situations
in which a fiduciary fails to disclose a conflict of interest.
Although she conceded that she had a fiduciary relationship with
BFTC, she claimed that the Superseding Indictment did not
reference a conflict of interest or allege that she had failed to
6

disclose any such conflict. Defendants both argued that several
of the counts in the Superseding Indictment were multiplicitous
and sought their dismissal on that ground. Neither defendant
moved to dismiss counts 23 through 29.
The District Court issued a memorandum opinion
addressing defendants’ motions to dismiss. The Court rejected
the defendants’ arguments regarding the scope of the mail and
wire fraud statutes and denied their motions to dismiss insofar
as they claimed that counts 1 through 22 failed to state an
offense. It agreed, however, that counts 10 through 18 violated
the rule against multiplicity. The District Court concluded that,
although the Government had identified a different victim, the
Government had impermissibly relied on the same mailings for
counts 10 through 18 as it had for counts 1 through 9. The
District Court subsequently afforded the Government the
opportunity to choose which counts it wished to advance at trial.
The Government selected counts 3, 5 through 11, 13, and 19
through 29.
Initially, both defendants pleaded not guilty, and the case
proceeded to trial. During the course of the trial, however,
Haluska entered an unconditional guilty plea. McGeehan
proceeded to verdict and was convicted on counts 6, 8, 9, 10, 11,
13, and 19 through 29. The District Court sentenced both
defendants to a 34-month term of imprisonment for each count,
to be served concurrently, and imposed three years of supervised
release. McGeehan and Haluska each filed timely notices of
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appeal.1 Upon a motion by the Government, we consolidated
their appeals.2
II.
The sufficiency of an indictment presents a question of
law over which we have plenary review. United States v.
Hodge, 211 F.3d 74, 76 (3d Cir. 2000). In evaluating an
indictment’s sufficiency, we consider “1) whether the indictment
‘contains the elements of the offense intended to be charged and
sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared
to meet,’ and 2) enables the defendant to plead an acquittal or
conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.”
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Moolenaar, 133 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763–64 (1962)).
The sufficiency of an indictment may be challenged not only on
the basis that it fails to charge the essential elements of the
statutory offense, but also on the ground that “the specific facts
alleged . . . fall beyond the scope of the relevant criminal statute,

1

Haluska’s challenge to the sufficiency of the
Superseding Indictment survived her guilty plea. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 586–89 (3d Cir. 2004);
United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 680, 685 (3d Cir.
2002).
2

The District Court exercised jurisdiction over this
criminal matter pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We exercise
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
8

as a matter of statutory interpretation.” United States v.
Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 685 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, defendants
contend that the specific facts alleged in the Superseding
Indictment do not constitute honest services fraud.
III.
The federal mail and wire fraud statutes criminalize the
use of the mails or wires to execute a “scheme or artifice to
defraud.” Specifically, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 provide in
part:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining
money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises . . . [uses
the mails or wires, or causes their use] for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned . . . .
To establish a violation of these statutes, the Government must
prove “(1) the defendant’s knowing and willful participation in
a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the specific intent to
defraud, and (3) the use of the mails or interstate wire
communications in furtherance of the scheme.” United States
v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 261 (3d Cir. 2001).
In McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), the
Supreme Court considered the reach of § 1341 and
acknowledged that the mail fraud statute had been “interpreted
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broadly.” Id. at 356. Indeed, § 1341 had been applied not only
to schemes to defraud others of money and property, but had
also been determined by each of the federal appellate courts
presented with the issue to reach “schemes . . . designed to
deprive individuals, the people, or the government of intangible
rights, such as the right to have public officials perform their
duties honestly.” Id. at 358. The use of the intangible rights
doctrine in the private sector resulted in the prosecution of
“purchasing agents, brokers, union leaders, and others with clear
fiduciary duties to their employers or unions,” who had been
found “guilty of defrauding their employers or unions by
accepting kickbacks or selling confidential information.” Id. at
363 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The McNally Court concluded, however, that the mail
fraud statute’s broad application was incompatible with its
language. In an effort to avoid a construction of the statute that
would leave “its outer boundaries ambiguous and involve[] the
Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good
government for local and state officials,” id. at 360, the Supreme
Court determined that § 1341 was “limited in scope to the
protection of property rights,” id., and did not prohibit schemes
to defraud individuals, the people, or the government of the
intangible right to honest services. See Antico, 275 F.3d at 261
n.16.
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In response to McNally, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §
1346, which provides that “the term ‘scheme or artifice to
defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services.” “Honest services fraud
typically occurs in two scenarios: (1) bribery . . . ; or (2) failure
to disclose a conflict of interest resulting in personal gain.”
Antico, 275 F.3d at 262–63.
3

A.
In our three principal honest services fraud cases decided
after McNally—United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245 (3d Cir.
2001); United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678 (3d Cir. 2002);
and United States v. Murphy, 323 F.3d 102 (3d Cir. 2003)—the
“honest services” at issue were allegedly owed not by private
individuals but by either a public official or, in the case of
Murphy, a county political party chairman alleged to have
attained the status of a de facto public official by his
participation in the county’s political system. See id. at 104.
The defendant in Antico was an official in Philadelphia’s
Department of Licenses and Inspections who failed to disclose
a variety of improper financial arrangements, including one in
which he regularly referred individuals who were willing to pay

3

Although “[s]ection 1346 was enacted without much
comment and little legislative history,” Antico, 275 F.3d at 261
n.16, the “commentary and judicial reflection indicate that the
statute was enacted to overturn McNally.” Id.
11

for assistance in completing licensing and permit applications to
the mother of his child as a means to avoid his obligation to
make direct child support payments. 275 F.3d at 261–65. We
concluded that Antico’s obligation to disclose his personal
interest in the official business he was handling arose by virtue
of both state and local laws. Id. at 263–64. We further noted
that “even if we were to read these [statutory] conflict of interest
provisions as restrictively as Antico suggests, we find that his
conduct violated the fiduciary relationship between a public
servant charged with disinterested decision-making and the
public he serves.” Id. at 264. This fiduciary relationship, we
explained, imposed upon the official a duty “to disclose material
information affecting an official’s impartial decision-making
and to recuse himself . . . regardless of a state or local law.” Id.
Because Antico’s intentional concealment of his conflict of
interest violated both state and local law, as well as his fiduciary
duty to the public, we concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to uphold Antico’s conviction for honest services fraud
under §§ 1341, 1343, and 1346. Id. at 264–65.
In Panarella, the owner of a tax collecting business
challenged the sufficiency of an information that charged him
with being an accessory after the fact to a state senator’s
commission of honest services fraud. 277 F.3d at 679–81.
Panarella did not dispute that the senator concealed a financial
interest in Panarella’s business contrary to Pennsylvania’s
disclosure statute, which criminalized such conduct. Id. at 679,
690. Instead, Panarella argued that, in the absence of an
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allegation that the senator misused his office for personal gain,
the superseding information failed to state an offense. Id. at
691–92. We rejected this argument, holding instead that “where
a public official takes discretionary action that the official
knows will directly benefit a financial interest that the official
has concealed in violation of a state criminal law, that official
has deprived the public of his honest services under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1346.” Id. at 691.
In rejecting Panarella’s argument, we reasoned that the
determination of whether a public official had misused his office
for personal gain was an ambiguous standard. Id. at 692–93.
The violation of Pennsylvania’s disclosure statute served as a
“better limiting principle for purposes of determining when an
official’s failure to disclose a conflict of interest amounts to
honest services fraud.” Id. The state statute at issue in
Panarella provided clear notice for purposes of the rule of lenity
that nondisclosure of the official’s conflict of interest was
criminal. Id. at 693. In addition, “the intrusion into state
autonomy is significantly muted, since the conduct that amounts
to honest services fraud is conduct that the state itself has
chosen to criminalize.” Id. at 694. Our holding, we explained,
had a “sound basis in both doctrine and policy,” as the official’s
conduct fell “squarely within the classical definition of fraud,”
which in its “elementary common law sense of deceit . . .
includes the deliberate concealment of material information in
a setting of fiduciary obligation.” Id. at 695 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
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In contrast to the status of the actors in Antico and
Panarella, the defendant in Murphy was neither a publiclyelected nor a publicly-employed official; rather, he served as the
chairman of a county political party. 323 F.3d at 104. We
reversed Murphy’s conviction for honest services fraud because
the Government failed to identify “any clearly established
fiduciary relationship or legal duty in either federal or state law
between Murphy and Passaic County or its citizens.” Id. at 117.
In reaching this conclusion, we noted that
[in Antico and Panarella] we assumed, based on
extensive pre-McNally case law, that public
officials have a duty to provide honest services to
the public. We then looked to state law to
ascertain what standards of fiduciary care the
public officials were required to meet in order to
determine whether the officials defrauded the
citizens of their right to honest services.
Id. at 115. In other words, collateral state laws established what
type of fiduciary duty was required in those cases and limited
the scope of honest services fraud. This limitation was
important, we explained, because the “plain language of § 1346
provides little guidance as to the conduct it prohibits[,]” id. at
116, and the “[d]eprivation of honest services is perforce an
imprecise standard.” Id. (quoting Panarella, 277 F.3d at 698).
For that reason, we “endorse[d] . . . the decisions of other Courts
of Appeals that have interpreted § 1346 more stringently and
required a state law limiting principle for honest services fraud.”
14

Id. “Without the anchor of a fiduciary relationship established
by state or federal law,” we concluded, “it was improper for the
District Court to allow the jury to create one.” Id. at 104.
As this caselaw makes clear, the key quandary in honest
services fraud jurisprudence is identifying the source of the
“honest services” that are owed under the statute and the precise
circumstances under which criminal liability can flow from the
deprivation of those services.4 “Courts have expressed
frustration at the lack of any ‘simple formula specific enough to
give clear cut answers to borderline problems.’” Sorich v.
United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1310 (2009) (quoting United
States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 300 (1st Cir. 2008)). Our court
has been no exception, as the trilogy of cases discussed above
illustrates. Antico and Panarella discussed the services owed by
public officials; in Murphy, services allegedly were owed by a
political party official whom the Government sought to treat as
a de facto public official. The honest services fraud theory as

4

“Though it consists of only 28 words, [§ 1346] has been
invoked to impose criminal penalties on a staggeringly broad
swath of behavior, including misconduct not only by public
officials and employees but also by private employees and
corporate fiduciaries.” Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308,
1309 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). A
broad interpretation would appear to cover, among other things,
“any self-dealing by a corporate officer.” Id.
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applied to public officials holds that a public official stands in
a fiduciary relationship with the public, and can commit honest
services fraud by breaching fiduciary duties in the course of that
relationship, such as by theft, accepting a bribe, or concealing a
financial conflict of interest. In close cases we have not been
unmindful of the potential for overreaching when prosecutors
pursue this theory. Most prominently, in Murphy we deployed
a “limiting principle” to guard against that potential in the public
official context: we “endorse[d] . . . the decisions of other
Courts of Appeals that have interpreted § 1346 more stringently
and required a state law limiting principle, 323 F.3d at 116,
namely “that state law must provide the specific honest services
owed by the defendant in a fiduciary relationship,” id. at 116 n.5
(citing United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734 (5th Cir.
1997)).5 We declined, however, to decide whether a link with
5

As noted, in Antico, the defendant had a fiduciary duty
to his employer to disclose his conflict of interest and to recuse
himself, in addition to the duties imposed on him by state and
local law. 275 F.3d at 264. We concluded that Antico’s breach
of state and local law, as well as the breach of his fiduciary duty,
deprived the public of the honest performance of his services.
Id. at 264–65. We reiterated this point in Panarella when we
declined to decide whether a violation of state law was
“necessary for nondisclosure of a conflict of interest to amount
to honest services fraud.” 277 F.3d at 699 n.9. Again, in
Murphy, we pointed out that in both Antico and Panarella, the
state law “clearly establishe[d] a fiduciary relationship.” 323
16

statutory law is necessary in every case. Murphy, 323 F.3d at
117 (reserving the question whether “a violation of a
[statutorily] created fiduciary duty is required to sustain an
honest services fraud conviction”); Panarella, 277 F.3d at 699
n.9 (same).6

F.3d at 117. We reversed Murphy’s conviction, however,
because the Government was not able to identify a preexisting
fiduciary duty created by statutory or common law. Id.
6

Indeed, our post-McNally § 1346 precedents speak
clearly only about what is sufficient to ground a charge of
honest services fraud; they are more equivocal about what is
necessary. For example, in both Antico and Panarella we held
that the violation of state criminal statutes requiring disclosure
of conflicts of interest by public officials was sufficient to show
a breach of fiduciary duty within the scope of § 1346, but we
also suggested in dicta that there may be an inherent “fiduciary
relationship between a public servant charged with disinterested
decision-making and the public he serves,” and that intentional
violations of fiduciary duties arising from this relationship might
serve as a predicate for honest services fraud “regardless of
[whether] state or federal law codif[ied] a conflict of interest.”
Antico, 275 F.3d at 264; see also Brumley, 116 F.3d at 734
(deciding that § 1346's “honest services” must find their source
in state law but not reaching the question of whether “the breach
of a duty to provide services rooted in state law [must] violate
the criminal law of the state”).
17

One purpose of the limiting principle we identified is to
avoid placing federal prosecutors and courts in the role of
regulating state and local politics, which might risk subverting
the delicate relationship between state and federal governance.
But there is another reason to require a limiting principle or
principles: the exercise of interpreting a malleable term in a
criminal statute which applies to a wide variety of activity may
generate nebulous standards that are not discernable to people
of ordinary intelligence. The latter problem is not confined to
cases involving public officials. Defining the scope of the
statute in its application to business relationships, like those at
issue here, is also important. The federalization under the
criminal law of the law of contracts and other business
transactions—quintessential matters for state regulation—is a
real concern. All of these considerations give pause to an
expansive judicial interpretation of § 1346.
As noted, none of our prior § 1346 cases involved purely
private actors. “The classic application of the intangible right to
honest services doctrine has been to a corrupt public servant
who has deprived the public of his honest services.” United
States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 365 (6th Cir. 1997). As one of
our sister circuits has opined, “[t]he right of the public to the
honest services of its officials derives at least in part from the
concept that corruption and denigration of the common good
violates ‘the essence of the political contract.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Jain, 93 F.3d 436, 442 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Although “the literal language of § 1346 extends to private
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sector schemes,” Jain, 93 F.3d at 441, “[e]nforcement of an
intangible right to honest services in the private sector” arguably
has a “weaker justification because relationships in the private
sector generally rest upon concerns and expectations less
ethereal and more economic than the abstract satisfaction of
receiving ‘honest services’ for their own sake.” Frost, 125 F.3d
at 365.
Nonetheless, caselaw supports the conclusion that private
actors can owe “honest services” under § 1346. As we have
noted, because “commentary and judicial reflection indicate that
[§ 1346] was enacted to overturn McNally and restore the
evolution of mail and wire fraud to its pre-McNally status,”
Antico, 275 F.3d at 262, in construing § 1346 we look to “preMcNally cases interpreting § 1341 and § 1343 for guidance.”
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 690; see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 (1992) (“[It is a] ‘wellestablished’ [rule of construction] that ‘[w]here Congress uses
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the
common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise
dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established
meaning of these terms.’” (quoting Community for Creative
Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989)) (alterations in
original)); United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 142 (2d Cir.
2003) (en banc) (finding “that [§ 1346's] phrase ‘scheme or
artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
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services’ has the meaning it had in the pre-McNally case law”).7
As these cases show, honest services fraud has been found to
encompass “purchasing agents, brokers, union leaders, and
others with clear fiduciary duties to their employers or unions
[who defrauded] their employers or unions by accepting
kickbacks or selling confidential information,” as well as private
actors who have “us[ed] the mails to defraud individuals of their
rights to privacy and other nonmonetary rights.” McNally, 483
U.S. at 363 & nn.3 & 4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing cases);
see Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 138 n.13 (further developing Justice
Stevens’s catalogue of private sector honest services fraud
cases). For example, in United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d
Cir. 1982), we affirmed the conviction of two defendants for
depriving employees of the honest services owed them by the
president of their union. Under federal law, we observed,
“[t]here is little doubt that union officials owe union members
a fiduciary duty.” Id. at 930. Dicta in our post-McNally caselaw
is consistent with this conclusion. See Antico, 275 F.3d at 261
(observing that the “intangible rights doctrine” reaches “public
and private fraud” (emphasis added)); id. at 263 (noting that the
7

But see Brumley, 116 F.3d at 733 (stating that because
“the doctrine of honest services was not a unified set of rules”
before McNally, “Congress could not have intended to bless
each and every pre-McNally lower court “honest services”
opinion). Brumley’s caveat is well taken, but as explained
below, we find sufficient consensus in the caselaw as to the
issues dispositive of this case.
20

“duty to disclose a conflict of interest” can arise “in the private
sector from the fiduciary relationship between an employer and
an employee”); see also infra note 11 (citing cases from other
courts of appeals).
B.
In this case, counts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 charged defendants
with depriving BFTC of their honest services (the “BFTC
counts”). The Superseding Indictment alleged that McGeehan
“was the President and Chief Executive Officer of BFTC and
was in control of its daily operations. He was answerable to
BFTC’s Board of Directors.” As to Haluska, the Superseding
Indictment averred that she “was the Vice-President and Chief
Operating Officer of BFTC, and worked closely with
[McGeehan] in managing its daily operations.”
While
McGeehan and Haluska were at the helm of BFTC, the
Superseding Indictment alleged that they acted in contravention
of the best interests of BFTC by “abus[ing] their authority by
knowingly causing BFTC to spend money in excess of amounts
budgeted.” As part of the scheme to defraud BFTC, the
Superseding Indictment averred that McGeehan and Haluska
“circumvent[ed] and prevent[ed the] operation of internal
controls designed to allow oversight of management and prevent
fiscal abuse.” This allowed “BFTC to pay for personal
expenditures for the benefit of [defendants] and other employees
without proper business purposes” and to make “excessive
expenditures” for lavish travel and entertainment. In addition,
defendants “impair[ed] the functions of employees assigned to
21

perform internal financial accounting that was intended to assure
that BFTC remained within budget and met its obligations to the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the United States Navy.” 8
The BFTC counts further averred that the defendants withheld
information from BFTC’s Board of Directors “that should have
been disclosed consistent with the honest fulfillment of their
employment responsibilities,” thereby breaching their duty to
operate BFTC in a fiscally responsible manner and causing the
BFTC to “suffer substantial financial harm.”
The above allegations are sufficient to demonstrate that
defendants owed a fiduciary duty to BFTC by virtue of their
status as corporate officers, and that defendants were obligated
to disclose any personal interests in matters over which they had
decision-making power. See In re United Artists Theatre Co.,
315 F.3d 217, 230 n.14 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that “officers are
fiduciaries of the corporations they serve”).9

8

We need not decide whether the allegations that
defendants circumvented management and accounting practices
would, unaccompanied by the other elements of the scheme,
suffice to charge honest services fraud.
9

One of our sister circuits has concluded that “[f]ederal
law governs the existence of fiduciary duty under the mail fraud
statute.” Frost, 125 F.3d at 366. We need not decide this issue
here, however, because it is clear that defendants owed a
fiduciary duty to BFTC under state law as well. See 15 Pa.
22

On appeal, defendants concede that they owed the BFTC
a fiduciary duty to disclose material information. The
Superseding Indictment adequately alleged facts to establish that
the defendants had a fiduciary relationship with BFTC of a type
recognized in our case law. We think the alleged intentional
violation of such a clearly defined fiduciary duty may serve as
the basis for an honest services fraud charge without offending
principles of fair notice or threatening to convert mere breaches
of contract into federal crimes. Accordingly, we find that counts
3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the Superseding Indictment made out the
necessary elements of honest services fraud and the District
Court did not err by denying the motion to dismiss these
counts.10

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1712; Seaboard Industries, Inc. v. Monaco,
276 A.2d 305, 309 (Pa. 1971) (discussing fiduciary duty owed
to a corporation by its directors and officers).
10

Noting our statement in Antico that “[h]onest services
fraud typically occurs in two scenarios: (1) bribery, where a
legislator was paid for a particular decision or action; or (2)
failure to disclose a conflict of interest resulting in personal
gain,” 275 F.3d at 262–63, Appellants suggest that the statute
covers only these two types of conduct. This argument is
unavailing for several reasons. First, as the modifier “typically”
implies, this categorization is not necessarily exhaustive.
Second, in Panarella, which we decided after Antico, we
expressly rejected the argument that honest services fraud
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requires a showing of personal gain. 277 F.3d at 692–93.
Third, and perhaps most significantly, we have no trouble
discerning a conflict of interest (which, for that matter, resulted
in personal gain) from the facts alleged in the Superseding
Indictment.
Appellants are alleged, inter alia, to have
misdirected corporate funds to finance personal expenditures.
In diverting corporate funds to unauthorized personal purposes,
Appellants, who were corporate officers, served their own
interests, rather than those of their corporation. Moreover,
Appellants failed to disclose this conflict of interest.
Appellants also assert that “[n]ot every breach of an
employee’s fiduciary duty to his employer constitutes mail or
wire fraud.” McGeehan’s Br. 8–9. Nothing we have said here
suggests otherwise. We hold only that a collateral fiduciary duty
can provide the source of the honest services owed under §§
1341, 1343, and 1346. The breach of such a duty can therefore
be the basis of a “depriv[ation] . . . of the intangible right of
honest services.” 18 U.S.C. § 1346. In order to give rise to
criminal liability, however, the deprivation of honest services
must have been the result of “a scheme or artifice . . . with the
specific intent to defraud.” Antico, 275 F.3d at 261 (listing the
elements of mail and wire fraud).
“[T]o avoid the over-criminalization of private
relationships,” Frost, 125 F.3d at 368, some courts of appeals
have added additional requirements, at least where the
defendants are private actors. The Sixth Circuit, for example,
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insists the prosecution demonstrate that a defendant “foresaw or
reasonably should have foreseen that [the entity to whom the
fiduciary duty is owed] might suffer an economic harm as a
result of the breach.” Id. To satisfy this requirement, the
prosecution need not show that “a defendant accused of
scheming to deprive another of honest services . . . intend[ed] to
inflict an economic harm upon the victim. Rather, the
prosecution must prove only that the defendant intended to
breach his fiduciary duty, and reasonably should have foreseen
that the breach would create an identifiable economic risk to the
victim.” Id. at 369.
Other courts have rejected the “reasonably foreseeable”
standard in favor of a materiality one, finding that the latter “has
the virtue of arising out of fundamental principles of the law of
fraud: A material misrepresentation is an element of the crime.”
Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 146 (“The ‘non-de minimis reasonably
foreseeable harm’ test, by contrast, seems to be something of an
ipse dixit designed simply to limit the scope of section 1346.”).
Under this standard, “the misrepresentation or omission at issue
for an ‘honest services’ fraud conviction must be ‘material,’
such that the information or omission would naturally tend to
lead or is capable of leading a reasonable employer to change its
conduct,” that is, “the victim’s knowledge of the scheme would
tend to cause the victim to change his or her behavior.” Id. at
145–46.
We need not decide which of these requirements, if
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C.
Defendants also challenge the sufficiency of counts 10,
11, 13, 19, 20, 21, and 22, in which the Navy was named as the
victim (the “Navy counts”). These counts advance a theory of
honest services fraud that is not within the core categories to
which our prior cases have referred. See Antico, 275 F.3d at
262–63 (setting out scenarios in which honest services fraud
“typically occurs”—bribery and failure to disclose conflicts of
interest); see also Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 141–42 (holding that a
“scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right to
honest services” in the private sector applies to “an officer or
employee of a private entity (or a person in a relationship that
gives rise to a duty of loyalty comparable to that owed by
employees to employers)” (footnote omitted)). The Navy counts
involve the conduct of private individuals who allegedly caused
one business entity to breach its contractual obligations to

either, is appropriate because the conduct alleged in the
Superseding Indictment clearly satisfies both standards. If the
defendants intentionally and deceptively misappropriated
BFTC’s funding for their own personal expenditures, as the
Superseding Indictment charges, it was reasonably foreseeable
(if not virtually inevitable) that this breach of fiduciary duty
would economically harm BFTC. This breach of fiduciary duty
was also material; a reasonable corporation, alerted to the
diversion of funds, would tend to alter its conduct to prevent the
misuse.
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another business entity. Unlike the BFTC counts, the Navy
counts do not involve services owed pursuant to a recognized
fiduciary relationship such as the officer-corporation
relationship, nor has the Government contended that any other
state or federal law provided for the honest services allegedly
owed by BFTC to the Navy.
We find that Antico, Panarella, and Murphy, in
combination with Boffa, are properly read to require that the
Government allege more than the breach of non-fiduciary
contractual duties in order to charge a private individual with
honest services fraud. We adhere to the view we espoused in
Panarella and Murphy that § 1346 requires a limiting principle.
Panarella, 277 F.3d at 693–94 (declaring that the “use of state
law as a limiting principle defining the scope of honest services
fraud” better addresses federalism concerns than the ambiguous
standard of whether there was a misuse of office for personal
gain); Murphy, 323 F.3d at 116–17 (noting that state law serves
as an important limiting principle on the scope of § 1346 honest
services fraud and avoids federalism concerns inherent in
federal prosecution of state or local political officials). Without
such a restraint, the reach of § 1346 is potentially limitless,
threatening to transform what are essentially contract and
employment disputes into federal crimes. As discussed above,
this potential implicates serious federalism concerns, turning
conduct that has traditionally been regulated by the states in
their civil and criminal courts into federal crimes. See United
States v. Cochran, 109 F.3d 660, 667 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting
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the breadth of § 1346, which “in the context of a commercial
transaction” could make “every breach of contract or every
misstatement made in the course of dealing” a deprivation of
honest services and a federal felony); see also United States v.
Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 973 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (acknowledging that § 1346 in the private sector context
“poses special risks” as “[e]very material act of dishonesty . . .
[could be] converted into a federal crime by the mere use of the
mails or interstate phone system”).11
11

Several of our sister courts of appeals have determined
that the breach of a fiduciary duty is sufficient to establish
honest services fraud. See United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d
1229, 1265 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming a § 1346 conviction of
a labor union official who owed a fiduciary duty to union
members); United States v. Williams, 441 F.3d 716, 723–24 (9th
Cir. 2006) (concluding that a financial advisor and estate
planner had a fiduciary duty to his client who had appointed him
as his agent in a durable power of attorney and had entrusted
him with large sums of money); United States v. Vinyard, 266
F.3d 320, 327–28 n.5 (4th Cir. 2001) (declining to decide
whether a breach of a fiduciary duty was necessary for an honest
services fraud conviction because the defendant had in fact
aided and abetted his brother’s breach of his fiduciary duty to
his corporate employer); United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d
1324, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 1999) (reversing a dismissal of the
indictment as it sufficiently alleged that the defendant breached
a fiduciary duty to his client, which had “relinquished de facto
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control of the underwriter selection decision” to the defendant);
United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1065 (8th Cir.
1999) (affirming an honest services fraud conviction of a
corporate officer who owed a fiduciary duty to disclose material
information to his corporation); see also Cochran, 109 F.3d at
665 (reversing a § 1346 conviction because the Government
failed to prove that the defendant had a duty to disclose).
We recognize that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has concluded that the existence of a fiduciary
relationship is not an element of honest services fraud. See
United States v. Ervasti, 201 F.3d 1029, 1036 (8th Cir. 2000).
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also so held in
United States v. Sancho, 157 F.3d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1998) (per
curiam); as explained infra, however, a subsequent en banc
decision undermines that holding.
In Sancho, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment
on the ground that the Government could not prove that a
fiduciary duty was owed. This argument was renewed in the
defendant’s Rule 29 motion. The Second Circuit rejected the
argument, holding that § 1346 does not require the existence of
a fiduciary relationship because the necessary element of § 1346
is “a scheme to deprive another of the right of honest services.”
157 F.3d at 920. The defendant relied upon pre-McNally case
law, which suggested that a fiduciary duty was necessary. Id. at
921 (citing United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962, 964 (7th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 926–27 (2d
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Cir. 1981); and United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999,
1006–07 (2nd Cir. 1980)). The court dismissed these cases as
no longer “pertinent” to the analysis of honest services fraud
after the enactment of § 1346. Id. Relying on §§ 1343 and 1346
only, the court reasoned that nothing in the language of these
statutes required a breach of a fiduciary duty. Id. at 920.
In Ervasti, the defendant, who was convicted under §§
1341 and 1346, argued on appeal that the district court abused
its discretion by instructing the jury that it could find a fiduciary
duty where none existed as a matter of law. 201 F.3d at 1036.
The Eighth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion because § 1346 does not require a fiduciary duty for
an honest services fraud conviction. Id. In so holding, the
Court acknowledged a prior Eighth Circuit decision in which the
defendant had breached a fiduciary duty, and the Court affirmed
the honest services fraud conviction. Id. (citing United States v.
Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 1999)). Citing Sancho, the
Ervasti court reasoned that there was no language in
Pennington, § 1341, or § 1346 that imposed a fiduciary duty
requirement. Id. Parenthetically, the Court acknowledged that
the existence of a fiduciary duty “may be a powerful indication
that [the defendant] also has deprived another of the right of
honest services.” Id.
The reasoning in Sancho and Ervasti—that no fiduciary
duty is required because the plain language of §§ 1341, 1343,
and 1346 does not impose such a requirement—is not
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persuasive. The imprecise language of these statutes, and their
consequent expansive reach, is the very reason we have hewed
to a jurisprudence of restraint in our interpretation of the honest
services fraud provision. See Panarella, 277 F.3d at 693;
Murphy, 323 F.3d at 115–16. Yet neither Sancho nor Ervasti
addresses this concern.
Moreover, Sancho has been undermined by the Second
Circuit’s subsequent en banc decision in Rybicki. There, the
Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Sancho dictum that preMcNally case law was not pertinent to understanding the reach
of § 1346. Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 144. The court in Rybicki
explained that pre-McNally case law was relevant for the limited
purpose of determining what Congress intended when it enacted
§ 1346. Id. at 145. Based on its analysis of case law prior to the
enactment of § 1346, Rybicki held that a “scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right to honest services” in the
private sector applied to “an officer or employee of a private
entity (or a person in a relationship that gives rise to a duty of
loyalty comparable to that owed by employees to employers).”
Id. at 141–42 (footnote omitted). Although the Second Circuit
did not clarify whether this duty of loyalty rose to the level of a
fiduciary obligation, the holding calls into question Sancho’s
insistence that no duty was required. Indeed, the Rybicki court
did make clear that its holding addressed the federalism and
lenity concerns posed by § 1346. Id. at 142 (“Because we find
that the phrase ‘scheme or artifice to deprive another of the
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Here, we find no allegations in the indictment suggesting
the presence of legally cognizable fiduciary duties owed by
BFTC to the Navy. In its brief on appeal, the Government
advances no argument that the indictment supports that theory,
instead relying solely on the duty of “good faith and fair
dealing” inherent in the contract. The contract itself does not
purport to impose any fiduciary duty on BFTC. At oral
argument, the Government suggested that BFTC was the Navy’s
fiduciary because it acted as the Navy’s agent under the
contract. But the indictment did not contain any allegations
suggesting that the BFTC had a relationship with the Navy of
the type that is regarded by state or federal law as imposing a
fiduciary duty upon the agent. Instead, the allegations of the
Superseding Indictment indicate that there was a contractual
relationship between the BFTC and the Navy, which obligated
the BFTC to administer the NNEOMT project.12

intangible right of honest services’ has the meaning it had in the
pre-McNally case law, we think that the potential reach of
section 1346 is not ‘virtually limitless.’ (citation omitted)).
12

The Superseding Indictment averred that the BFTC
“operat[ed] under the supervision of the Pennsylvania
Department of Community and Economic Development.” Its
“public mission” was “to encourage and facilitate technological
advances and associated economic growth” in Western
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Pennsylvania. To that end, BFTC “administered funds allocated
by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for economic
development grants.” In 1995, BFTC began to administer funds
allocated under the NNEOMT Agreement with the Navy. The
Superseding Indictment alleged that the BFTC received funds
from both the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Navy to
“fund payments owed . . . to grant recipients or to research
subcontractors” and “to pay for BFTC’s own legitimate
expenses incurred in administering” the Commonwealth grant
program and the NNEOMT Agreement. The funds allocated by
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Navy were to be
used “solely for the administration of” the Commonwealth grant
program and the NNEOMT, respectively. In contravention of
the requirements imposed by the Commonwealth and the
NNEOMT Agreement, defendants “caus[ed] BFTC improperly
to spend excessive amounts for unallowable, unreasonable and
unnecessary costs, including costs for lavish travel and
entertainment, and costs otherwise without a proper business
purpose.” Defendants permitted the entry of these expenses on
BFTC’s books as though they were “ordinary general and
administrative expenses, or direct expenses, that the
organization was allowed to incur” under the NNEOMT
Agreement. Among the unauthorized expenses was a lavish
event costing more than $700,000 and paid for using funds
allocated under the NNEOMT contract. The unauthorized
expenditures caused funding shortfalls under the NNEOMT
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Because the Superseding Indictment contained no facts
suggesting that BFTC owed a fiduciary duty to the Navy, we
conclude that the Superseding Indictment did not aver sufficient
facts to allege the aiding and abetting of honest services fraud in
counts 10, 11, 13, 19, 20, 21, and 22.
IV.
For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the judgment
of the District Court as to counts 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. We will
vacate the judgment of the District Court on counts 10, 11, 13,
19, 20, 21, and 22. Defendants claim that their convictions on

Agreement.
These allegations clearly established that there was a
contractual agreement between the BFTC and the Navy.
Although the Superseding Indictment did not allege that the
parties to this NNEOMT Agreement owed a duty of good faith
and fair dealing to each other, the existence of the contract
suggests that such a duty existed. See Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 205 (1981). As we explained above, however, the
fact that a contract imposes a duty of good faith and fair dealing
does not, without more, create a fiduciary relationship. Our
scrutiny of the allegations of the Superseding Indictment reveals
nothing that would have converted this NNEOMT Agreement
from an arm’s length transaction between sophisticated parties
into a relationship imposing a fiduciary duty upon BFTC.
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counts 23 through 29, for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1031, were
tainted by the introduction of evidence related to the mail and
wire fraud counts. We will remand to the District Court for
determination of this issue.
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